EXHIBIT(S) - D - Revised Sales Comp Analysis December 03, 2021 (2024)

Case

Claire Gallagher v. New Rochelle City

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91200/2024

Case

Supreme Court Of The State Of New York County Of Westchester v. U.S. Bank Na, Successor Trustee To Bank Of America, Na, Successor In Inteerest To Lasalle Bank Na, As Trustee, On Behalf Of The Holders Of The Wamu Mortgage Passthrough Certificates, Series 2007- Oa3, Debra Matts, Gerald Matts, Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Fka Washington Mutual Bank Fka Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.,, Capital One, N.A., America'S Wholesale Lender, John Doe

Aug 15, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |67340/2024

Case

Lisheng Cai v. Mount Vernon City

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91039/2024

Case

Filipe Pereira v. Mount Vernon City

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91178/2024

Case

Ladonna Hutchins Thompson v. Mount Vernon City

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91183/2024

Case

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb, As Owner Trustee Of The Residential Credit Opportunities Trust Viii-C v. Douglas S. Flaherty, Td Bank Usa, N.A., American Express National Bank, Bank Of America, N.A., Midland Funding Llc, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., John Doe And Jane Doe

Aug 16, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |67430/2024

Case

Gabriel Romano v. Mount Vernon City

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91189/2024

Case

David Bases v. New Rochelle City

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91102/2024

Case

Gregory Pryce v. New Rochelle City

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Real Property - SCAR |Other Real Property - SCAR |91138/2024

Ruling

Lapointe, Adele C vs. Moore, James S

Aug 26, 2024 |S-CV-0052053

S-CV-0052053 Lapointe, Adele C vs. Moore, James S** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required. Cross Complaint of Moore [filed 05/15/24] is not at issue- Need status as to ROE Cross Defendants.

Ruling

Frances Semoes, et al. vs Josh Reingeisen, et al.

Aug 13, 2024 |20CV-03468

20CV-03468 Frances Semoes, et al. v.Josh Reingeisen, et al.Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal-Notice of SettlementDropped from Calendar, Order granting joint request for dismissal filed April 5, 2024.

Ruling

MARK WILLIAM HYLES VS. LAWRENCE GONZALES ET AL

Aug 12, 2024 |CUD24675163

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for August 12, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT LAWRENCE GONZALES DEMURRER to COMPLAINT is OVERRULED. The Complaint is not uncertain. Defendant shall have 5 days from the notice of entry of order to file an answer. =(501/SKF) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

FRANCISCO BRIGIDO NAVA, ET AL. VS GREG JARA, ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |23TRCV00741

Case Number: 23TRCV00741 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B FRANCISCO BRIGIDO NAVA, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV00741 vs. [Tentative] RULING GREG JARA, Defendant. Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Moving Parties: Attorney Hector C. Perez, for defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jara Responding Party: None Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel The Court considered the moving papers. RULING The motion is GRANTED. The motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jara, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the client. BACKGROUND On March 15, 2023, plaintiffs Francisco Brigido Nava and Maria Gomez Ruiz filed a complaint against Greg Jara for (1) negligence, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) wrongful eviction, and (4) fraud. On May 1, 2023, defendant Greg Jara filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs for (1) abuse of elder person and (2) IIED. On July 18, 2024, the Court denied defense counsels motion to be relieved as counsel without prejudice as counsel did not use the mandatory form for counsels declaration. Trial is set for November 13, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 398. CRC Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). DISCUSSION Defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jaras attorney, Hector C. Perez, seeks to be relieved as counsel. Counsel states in his declaration that his client advised him that he did not want counsel to work on the matter anymore and that counsel was further informed that the client was in the process of hiring another attorney. The Court finds that the attorney submitted a declaration establishing that the service requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362, have been satisfied. The Court also finds that the attorney has shown sufficient reason why the motion to be relieved as counsel should be granted. The motion is GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jara, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the client. Moving counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES vs. CONEY ISLAND FARMS, INC.

Aug 07, 2024 |C24-01489

C24-01489CASE NAME: STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCESVS. CONEY ISLAND FARMS, INC.HEARING ON PETITION IN RE: FOR ORDER PERMITTING ENTRY AND INVESTIGATION OF REALPROPERTYFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*On June 7, 2024, Petitioner, the State of California, by and through the Department of WaterResources filed a petition for order permitting entry and investigation of real property againstRespondent Coney Island Farms, Inc. Petitioner seeks access to real property in Contra Costa County,Assessor Parcel Numbers (APNs) 001-111-004 and 001-111-005. (Initial Petition, 6:10–12.) Petitionerrequests access to the subject properties for 11 intermittent 12-hour days for a period of 12 monthsin order to conduct geological surveys and tests, as well as biologic and cultural site clearances andsurveys. (Id. at 6:11–20.). The court has no indication the respondent has been served and givennotice of the hearing on the petition. The court continues the matter to August 21, 2024, to ensurerespondent has received notice.

Ruling

763 Las Olas Drive, LLC, et al vs John Voris, et al

Aug 15, 2024 |22CV01609

22CV01609763 LAS OLAS DRIVE LLC v. JOHN VORIS, et al. SUPPLEMENT BRIEFING RE EQUITABLE SERVITUDE - DEFENDANTS VORIS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION SUPPLEMENT BRIEFING RE EQUITABLE SERVITUDE - PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION I. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION: On 3/28/24, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment/adjudication were heard.The court’s summary ruling on those motions was: Defendants’ motion for summary judgment/adjudication is denied on the grounds there are material facts in dispute as to all four issues presented in the motion: (1) if the Elworthy Deed adequately describes the dominant tenement to be benefited by its deed restrictions; (2) if the Elworthy Deed states any obligation of the grantor to impose restrictions on any portion of the Beach Land for the benefit of the Voris Property; (3) if plaintiffs’ have a real property right to protected views; and (4) if the Vorises acted or failed to act in any manner that substantially interferes with plaintiffs’ real property interests. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication as to its first cause of action for breach of equitable servitude is denied on the grounds there are material facts in dispute as to if there are applicable deed restrictions that are enforceable as equitable servitudes. As to defendants’ laches defense, the motion for summary adjudication is also denied; a trier of fact could determine based upon admissible evidence presented by defendants that plaintiffs did unreasonably delay in bringing the action and they were prejudiced. Following the court’s denial of both motions, the parties stipulated to vacate the trial dateand submit the equitable servitude issue to the court for determination. The question before thecourt in the parties’ supplemental briefing is whether an equitable servitude restricting buildingbeyond a particular point on the seaward side of the parcel burdens defendants’ property. As explained below, the court finds that all elements of an equitable servitude regarding abuilding setback are met and therefore grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication as totheir first cause of action. Page 5 of 14 II. EQUITABLE SERVITUDE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT Is defendants’ property burdened by an equitable servitude that restricts building past aspecific seaward setback line? Defendants say no and argue that an expired seaward setbackrestriction in a prior grant deed is unenforceable. Since the parties’ renewed separate statements rely on their respective requests forjudicial notice and historical documents related to the properties at issue (763 Las Olas Drive and761 Las Olas Drive), and since the parties’ seek the court’s final determination on this issue, thecourt is able to determine the issue as a matter of law. A. Plaintiffs’ evidence supporting that Las Olas Drive homes are burdened by an equitable servitude restricting building past a seaward setback Plaintiffs provide the following undisputed facts: Plaintiffs and defendants ownresidential properties adjacent to each other on Las Olas Drive, in Aptos. (UMF 1.) Theseproperties are two of 29 residential parcels in a subdivision located on Las Olas Drive, whichextends west from Seacliff State Beach. (UMF 2.) SCLTC was the common grantor of the parcels in the subdivision. (UMF 3.)1 A recorded1927 SCLTC agreement (the “1927 Agreement”) shows that SCLTC intended a general plan forthe subdivision. The 1927 Agreement, related to the sale of land on Seacliff Beach, provides that“certain portions of the above described land” … “known as the ‘westerly portion’, being about2400 feet in length…” could be subdivided and sold. (UMF 4.) It further provides that the deedsrecording the sales of any such subdivided property must be substantially similar to the oneattached to the agreement as Exhibit B. (UMF 5.) That model deed called for several restrictionslimiting the owners’ use of the property, and states that the restrictions are “part of a general planfor the benefit of the whole of its so-called ‘Beach Land’.” (UMF 6.) Between 1927 and 1944, SCLTC or its officers recorded deeds transferring the lots onwhich 28 of the 29 current residential properties are located. (UMF 7.) Each of the deeds forthese 28 properties reference numbered lots on an “unrecorded map” either “of Beach LandsSubdivision, Seacliff Park” or “Seacliff Beach Subdivision” to refer to the land being conveyed.(UMF 8). The County keeps an unrecorded map, numbered A80-474, dated May 1928, drawn bythe County surveyor, titled “Beach Lands Subdivision, Seacliff Park” (the “1928 Map”) availableon the County surveyor’s website. (UMF 9.) The 1928 Map depicts lots numbered 1-48. (UMF10). Defendants’ surveyor mapped the deeds referring to all 29 residential properties on Las Olas1 Defendants attempt to dispute several of plaintiffs’ UMFs: “Disputed insofar as Plaintiffs’ UMF is an inaccurate,incomplete, argumentative characterization. The deeds speak for themselves.” (See UMFs 3-8, 11, 13, 16, 17.) Thecourt agrees that the deeds speak for themselves and finds that these facts are not truly disputed. Defendants’responses are not sufficiently unequivocal as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(h). Page 6 of 14Drive and uniformly showed they correspond with the numbered lots 14-48 on the 1928 Map.(UMF 11.) Defendants’ preliminary title report, prepared when they purchased their property,included the County Tax Assessor’s Map, which depicts the “Beachlands Sub,” and refers toproperties with lot numbers consistent with the 1928 Map. (UMF 12.) Several recorded maps citethe 1928 Map by number (A80-474) in reference to the “Beach Lands,” and the County’s April19, 2024 agenda for the Zoning Administrator referred to the property at 753 Las Olas Drive as“located in ‘Beach Lands’, a gated beach community lying at the base of a steep, coastal bluffthat is located to the west of Seacliff State Park.” (UMF 13 & 15.) Defendants’ surveyor alsomapped “the ‘westerly portion’, being about 2400 feet in length” that the 1927 Agreement calledto subdivide and showed that it is consistent with the area of land depicted on the 1928 Map.(UMF 14.) Each of the original deeds for the 28 Las Olas Drive properties (dating from 1927-1944),including the deeds conveying plaintiffs’ and defendants’ properties, are substantially consistentwith the model deed attached as Exhibit B to the 1927 Agreement and contain property userestrictions, including the setback restriction that is the subject of this lawsuit: “It is expresslyconditioned…that no portion of any building on said property shall extend further towards theBay of Monterey than a line described as follows: [description].” (UMF 16.) Each of the deeds also state: The Grantor hereby declares that the foregoing are part of a general plan for the benefit of the whole of its so-called ‘Beach Land[s]’; that the same are not covenants, but conditions subsequent running with the land; that they intend hereby to convey a conditional estate; and that on breach of any such conditions they reserve the right to re- enter said property, and without notice to remove any such prohibited structure, animal or person and to institute and prosecute an action to cancel this deed and to quiet title to said property. Provided that no such breach no re-entry, nor anything herein contained, shall defeat the lien of any mortgage, or any deed of trust to secure a debt, but said conditions shall remain in force as against any owner of said property acquiring same under foreclosure of mortgage or sale under deed of trust. (UMF 17.) The original deed conveying defendants’ property (Elworthy Deed) from November 1944includes language appearing to restrict building past a particular seaward point: “…that noportion of any building on said property shall extend further towards the Bay of Monterey than aline described as follows: [metes and bounds].” (Plaintiffs’ RJN Ex. 1 (Appendix of Evidence inSupport of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication, filed 1/4/24).) Defendants purchasedtheir property in late 2019; the deed related to this transfer contains language identifying the Page 7 of 14unrecorded map of the Beach Lands Subdivision in the legal description, but no otherrestrictions. (Plaintiffs’ RJN Ex. 30.) B. Defendants’ facts supporting no equitable servitude Defendants’ primary contention is that the original grantor, Santa Cruz Land TitleCompany (“SCLTC”), entered into a three-year installment contract in 1927 permitting thesubdivision of the area known as the Seacliff Beach Subdivision. During that three-year period,any lots sold were to use one of two form deeds, both of which included language limitingbuilding beyond a line parallel with and 70 feet southerly from the northern lot boundary.Following that three-year period in the 1940’s, some of the lots – including plaintiffs’ anddefendants’ – were transferred back to SCLTC following a probate order and the title to thoselots were transferred by four separate deeds, one of which is the 1944 Elworthy Deed(defendants’ parcel). Defendants insist that the restrictions were only for the benefit of SCLTCwhile it held title and following the three-year period, parcels could be and were transferredwithout restrictions. (Defendants’ Exs. 41, 42, 50, 53, and 61.) They opine that the restrictionsexpired by the terms of the original grant installment contract. Noteworthy is that the Elworthy Deed conforms to the model deed and contains languagelimiting building beyond a particular point towards the ocean, the setback at issue. (Defendants’RJN 1.) Despite this, defendants argue the deed fails to create an equitable servitude because itonly describes that its restrictions are for the benefit of the “Beach Lands,” which they claim istoo vague to describe the dominant tenement, and that it does not apply the restrictions for thebenefit of all other parcels and those other parcels are subject to a like restriction for the benefitof defendants. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Deed interpretation "[A]ll presumptions are in favor of the validity of a deed when it is regular on its face andrecorded or acknowledged…. these presumptions are not conclusive but the burden ofovercoming them is on the one who disputes them." (Du Bois v. Larke (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d737, 745.) Extrinsic evidence is only admissible to aid in the interpretation of a deed where theambiguity appears on the face of the deed. (See, e.g., Baker v. Ramirez (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d1123, 1133.) B. Equitable servitudes A covenant that does not run with the land “may be enforceable in equity against atransferee of the covenantor who takes with knowledge of its terms under circ*mstances which Page 8 of 14would make it inequitable to permit him to avoid the restriction.” (Marra v. Aetna Const. Co.(1940) 15 Cal.2d 375, 378 (Marra).) An equitable servitude does not require that the property to be benefitted be identified inthe deed to be enforceable, and does not require a written agreement between plaintiff anddefendants. (MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 693,699-700; Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 354 (Citizens);Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 375-381.)“[B]urdensome covenants which do not run with the land may be enforced on behalf of theoriginal grantor or his assigns as equitable servitudes against transferees acquiring property withactual or constructive notice of the restrictions, when failure to enforce the restrictions wouldproduce an inequitable result. [Citations.]” (MacDonald Properties, Inc., supra, 72 Cal.App.3dat 700.) The doctrine of equitable servitudes makes enforceable at equity a covenant appurtenantto other benefited property that might be otherwise unenforceable. (Marra, supra, 15 Cal.2d at378-379; Committee to Save Beverly Highlands Homes Ass'n v. Beverly Highlands HomesAss'n (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1269; Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 354-355.) Equitableservitudes are enforceable “although they benefit or restrict only a single parcel of land.” (Marra,supra, 15 Cal.2d at 378; see also S. California Sch. of Theology v. Claremont GraduateUniv. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1, 8.) Equitable servitudes are enforceable provided the person bound by the restrictions hadnotice of their existence, and such notice is necessarily accomplished by the recording of adeed. (Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Committee (1976) 17 Cal.3d 500, 507; Nahrstedt v.Lakeside Vill. Condo. Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 375; Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 355.) “Case law has established several requirements for the creation of an enforceableequitable servitude. Generally, equitable servitudes must be created by a recorded deed orwritten agreement between landowners; the dominant tenement to be benefited by the restrictionsmust be described; the intent of both parties (the common grantor and the initial grantee) tocreate a common general plan of restrictions must be demonstrated; and a subsequent granteemust have record or actual notice of the restriction when he receives title to the property. (Miller& Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, Covenants and Restrictions, § 22.7 to 22.12, pp. 546-557.) Equitable servitudes are also required to be strictly construed. (Wing v. Forest LawnCemetery Assn. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 472, 479 [Citation.].)” (Soman Properties v. Rikuo Corp.(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 471, 484.) "For such a servitude to exist, the three requirements under Werner are: (1) that the deedsevidence an intention on the part of both the grantor and the grantee that the land conveyed is tobe restricted pursuant to a general plan; (2) that the deeds show that the parcel conveyed issubject to the restriction at issue in accordance with the plan for the benefit of all the other Page 9 of 14parcels in the subdivision and such other parcels are subject to like restriction for its benefit; and(3) that the dominant and servient tenements be adequately shown." (Greater Middleton Assn. v.Holmes Lumber Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 980, 991, referring to Werner v. Graham (1919) 181Cal. 174.) “If these conditions are met, the grantee of the first deed from the developer as well assubsequent grantees are entitled to enforce the covenants as to all the remaining area placedunder equitable servitude.” (McCaffrey v. Preston (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 422, 437.) “If a declaration establishing a common plan for the ownership of property in asubdivision and containing restrictions upon the use of the property as part of the common plan,is recorded before the execution of the contract of sale, describes the property it is to govern, andstates that it is to bind all purchasers and their successors, subsequent purchasers who haveconstructive notice of the recorded declaration are deemed to intend and agree to be bound by,and to accept the benefits of, the common plan; the restrictions, therefore, are not unenforceablemerely because they are not additionally cited in a deed or other document at the time of thesale.” (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 349, emphasis in original.) C. Constructive notice “Civil Code section 1213 provides that every ‘conveyance’ of real property recorded asprescribed by law provides ‘constructive notice’ of its contents to subsequent purchasers. Theterm ‘conveyance’ is broadly defined to include ‘every instrument in writing … by which thetitle to any real property may be affected....’ [Citation.] Constructive notice ‘is the equivalent ofactual knowledge; i.e., knowledge of its contents is conclusively presumed.’ [Citation.]”(Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 355.) “[I]t is reasonable to conclude that property conveyed after the restrictions are recorded issubject to those restrictions even without further mention in the deed. ‘The issue in these cases isthe intent of the grantors and grantees at the time of the conveyance.’ (Fig Garden Park etc.Assn. v. Assemi Corp., supra, 233 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1709.) This intent can be inferred from therecorded uniform plan. It is express on the part of the seller, implied on the part of thepurchaser. The law may readily conclude that a purchaser who has constructive notice, andtherefore knowledge, of the restrictions, takes the property with the understanding that it, as wellas all other lots in the tract, is subject to the restrictions, and intends and agrees to accept theirburdens and benefits, even if there is no additional documentation evidencing the intent at thetime of the conveyance. ‘If future takers purchase a piece of property with notice of arestriction made by a predecessor, then, in the absence of duress or fraud, they may ordinarily bethought to have bargained for the property with the restriction in mind, and to have shownthemselves willing to abide by it.’ (Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments onProfessors French and Reichman (1982) 55 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1403, 1405.)” (Citizens, supra, 12Ca1.4th at 365-366.) Page 10 of 14 IV. DISCUSSION The parties agree that Werner and Greater Middleton establish the factors needed tocreate an equitable servitude. (Werner, supra, 181 Cal. At 180-181; Greater Middleton, supra,222 Cal.App.3d at 991.) Applying those factors here, the court finds that an equitable servituderestricting building past a particular seaward boundary does exist and applies to the Las OlasDrive subdivision which includes plaintiffs’ and defendants’ properties. A. Mutual intent to restrict pursuant to a general plan Here, a general plan and mutual intent is evidenced by the plain language of the deeds. The general plan is the Beach Lands Subdivision or “Beach Lands,” which is described indefendants’ deed/Elworthy Deed and the other 27 deeds for parcels on Las Olas Drive. Thosedeeds also contain the same restriction on building past a particular seaward point. Defendantsargue the deeds only describe the grantor’s intent but concede that their deed is the finalexpression of the grantor (SCLTC) and grantee (Elworthy). (See Defendants’ SupplementalMemorandum, p. 9.) Deeds constitute “the final and exclusive memorial of their [grantor andgrantee’s] joint intent.” (Werner, supra, 181 Cal. at 182.) The deeds also plainly bind successors by including the following language: • “conditions subsequent running with the land” (Monterey/Santa Cruz etc. Trades Council v. Cypress Marina Heights LP (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1519 [“‘run with the land’ is a term of art used ‘to express an intent to bind successors’”]; Civil Code § 1460 [covenants that run with the land bind the assigns of the covenantor]; • “conditions shall remain in force as against any owner of said property” • “shall never be constructed” indicating an intent to bind future grantees Where deeds in a common tract contain similar restrictions, courts have found equitableservitudes even where the restrictions were not explicitly made in every single deed. (SeeGamble v. Fierman (1927) 82 Cal.App. 180, 182-187; Robertson v. Nichols (1949) 92 Cal.Ap.2d201, 203, 206; Mock v. Shulman (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 263, 267; and Greater Middleton, supra,222 Cal.App.3d at 992 [despite 14 of 77 deeds failing to reference the general plan and 13 of 77deeds failing to include the restriction, the court found that the “general scheme of restrictionsmust be uniform in character to indicate unmistakably a designated and adopted plan…somevariety is to be expected….”].) Page 11 of 14 B. Like restrictions The deeds must also show that the parcels conveyed are subject to the restriction inaccordance with the plan for the benefit of all the other parcels, and such other parcels aresubject to like restriction for its benefit. Each deed, including the Elworthy Deed, plainly identifies the setback restriction andstates “that the foregoing [restrictions] are part of a general plan for the benefit of the whole ofits so called ‘Beach Land.’” Deeds for 27 of the other 28 properties in the subdivision, whichinclude these restrictions and the common statement that they are “part of a general plan for thebenefit of the whole,” confirm that the other parcels are subject to the same restriction. While thecourt finds the 28 deeds and their restrictions uniform enough, even if there was more variety inthe restriction or general plan language, Greater Middleton instructs that equitable servitudesmay still be found. “The general scheme of restrictions must be sufficiently uniform in characterto indicate unmistakably a designated and adopted plan throughout common to all purchasers oflots…[,] [but] some variety is to be expected inasmuch as it is common to plan for thedevelopment of some parcels in a manner different from but complementary to the majority ofthe parcels.” (Greater Middleton, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at 992 (citations omitted).) While the court need not rely on extrinsic evidence for this finding, it notes that thehomeowners’ association for the Las Olas Drive properties (the Sea Cliff Beach Association) hasacknowledged and enforced an approximate 75-foot setback from the ocean for years anddefendants’ architect, surveyor and previous attorney all understood a setback existed. (BeachDeclaration, Exs. F, R, S, T, Y, AA, BB, CC, FF, HH.) C. Dominant and servient tenements Finally, both the dominant and servient tenements must be shown in the deeds. Here,defendants’ deed, and its original predecessor the Elworthy Deed, both identify the parcel by lotnumber, the same metes and bounds, and reference to the unrecorded 1928 map of the BeachLands Subdivision. (UMF 1, 8.) This adequately describes the burdened property, i.e. theservient tenement. The deed also describes the dominant tenement – “the foregoing are part of a general planfor the benefit of the whole of its so-called “Beach Land.” Naming the benefited tract of land orsubdivision alone is sufficient to identify it. (Robertson v. Nichols (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 201,206; Ames v. Prodon (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 94, 100 (“where land has a descriptive name, it maybe adequately described by its name alone”); Anderson Cottonwood Irr. Dist. v. Zinzer (1942) 51Cal.App.2d 587, 590 (where no “other parcel of land in [the county] answers to” the same name,merely using the name is enough).) Page 12 of 14 Defendants’ argument that “Beach Lands” is ambiguous and therefore cannot describethe dominant tenement is not supported by the evidence. They argue that the Elworthy Deed failsto define or describe with any certainty the real property that comprises the Beach Lands and sotherefore fails to define the dominant tenement. However, even with variation and withoutspecific metes and bounds or legal descriptions, dominant tenements can be established. “Considering the uniformity and consistency in the vast majority of the deeds relative to the statement of the general plan and the restrictive covenants restricting the use of the land conveyed therein; considering the fact that the first 17 deeds which contain statements of the general plan in conjunction with the restrictive covenants, uniformly describe the dominant tenement in terms of the entire Middleton Tract; considering the significant variation in the description of the dominant tenement in the deeds thereafter and such obvious and blatant errors in these descriptions as the designation of township 8 as township 3; considering the number of deeds wherein it is erroneously stated following a description of the dominant tenement that the property "herein conveyed" is a part of the tract described; and, finally, considering the aforementioned extrinsic evidence, it is clear that the dominant tenement which both the grantor and grantee had in mind, in each and every instance, was and had to be -- Middleton Tract.” (Greater Middleton, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at 994-995.) Here, the deeds all refer to an unrecorded 1928 map labeled either the “Beach LandsSubdivision” or “Seacliff Beach Subdivision.” (UMF 17.) The 1928 map fits this description.“When a lot conveyed by a deed is described by reference to a map, such map becomes a part ofthe deed.” (Danielson v. Sykes (1910) 157 Cal. 686, 690.) Plaintiffs also point out thatDefendants’ own surveyor mapped the properties on Las Olas Drive and showed that thenumbered parcels in the deeds match the numbered parcels on the 1928 map, and that thesubdivided area in the 1927 SCLTC agreement matches the 1928 map. (UMF 11, 14.) Severalrecorded maps, including the County Tax Assessor’s map, refer to the 1928 map as the mapdescribing Beach Lands. (UMF 13.) This evidence is sufficient to describe the dominanttenement – that of the Beach Lands, now identified as Las Olas Drive. Since all elements of finding an equitable servitude are met here, the court grantssummary adjudication for plaintiffs as to their first cause of action. V. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice: 1. Articles of Incorporation, Santa Cruz Land Title Company, 6/6/1923: Granted. 2. Grant deed, Santa Cruz Land Title Company to Foote, 1/9/1933: Granted. Page 13 of 14 3. County of Santa Cruz Planning Dept., Staff Report re Sea For Yourself LLC, APN 038-461-18, 753 Las Olas Drive, Aptos, 4/19/24: Deny; unrelated to the properties at issue. The court incorporates its rulings on the parties’ respective requests for judicial noticefrom their original motions for summary judgment/adjudication.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 14 of 14

Ruling

FABRIZIO BLANCO, ET AL. VS HM DG, INC., ET AL.

Aug 13, 2024 |24SMCV00706

Case Number: 24SMCV00706 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Blanco, et al., v. HM DG Inc., et al. CASE NO.: 24SMCV00706 MOTION: Motion to Compel Initial and Further Discovery Responses HEARING DATE: 8/13/2024 Legal Standard If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905-906.) Where there has been no timely response to a CCP section 2031.010 inspection demand, the demanding party must seek an order compelling a response. (CCP § 2031.300.) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product. Thus, unless the party to whom the demand was directed obtains relief from waiver, he or she cannot raise objections to the documents demanded. There is no deadline for a motion to compel responses. Likewise, for failure to respond, the moving party need not attempt to resolve the matter outside court before filing the motion. Where the motion seeks only a response to the inspection demand, no showing of "good cause" is required. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs Fabrizio and Natalia Blanco move to compel Defendant HM DG Inc. to provide initial discovery responses within 10 days, without objections, to the following discovery: 1) Requests for Production of Documents (RPD), Set One; 2) Special Interrogatories (SROG), Set One; and 3) Form Interrogatories (FROG), Set One. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs also filed a motion to compel further responses to RPDs, set one and SROGs, set one. Plaintiff requests sanctions of $1,300.00 per motion. Compel Initial Responses to RPDs; Further Responses to RPDs and SROGs Plaintiffs show that there were objection-only responses to the subject RPDs. Thus, the proper motion to bring is a motion to compel further. (CCP § 2031.300.) As to the motions to compel further, such motions must always be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (CRC, Rule 3.1345.) Plaintiffs have not provided any separate statement in support of their motions to compel further. Accordingly, the motions to compel initial and further responses to the first set of RPDs and the motion to compel further responses to the SROGs are DENIED. Compel Initial Responses to SROGs/FROGs On April 29, 2024, Plaintiffs served FROGs, Set One, on HMDG. The original response deadline was May 31, 2024. (Kakoian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) HMDG failed to serve timely responses. (Id., ¶ 4.) On June 5, 2024, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a meet and confer email to HMDG's counsel, requesting HMDG's failure to respond and requesting verified responses within 10 days. (¶ 5.) Over the next month, HMDG repeatedly requested extensions while failing to provide proper responses but has not served verified responses to the interrogatories. (¶¶ 6-8.) Defendant has not filed an opposition to the motions to compel initial responses to the interrogatories. Accordingly, the motions to compel are GRANTED. Sanctions are mandatory. The Court must sanction any party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP, § 2030.290(c).) As Defendant has failed to oppose, it has failed to justify its non-response. Sanctions are imposed in the reduced, total amount of $1,500.00, inclusive of costs against Defendant and counsel of record. Responses are ordered within 10 days. Sanctions are payable to Plaintiffs counsel within 30 days.

Ruling

MONTANO INVESTMENTS, INC. VS USA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC, ET AL.

Aug 15, 2024 |22STCV04061

Case Number: 22STCV04061 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 78 ¿ MONTANO INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff(s), vs. USA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendant(s). Case No.: 22STCV04061 (C/W 22STUD00257, 22STUD00250) Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Montano Investments, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed its First Amended Complaint (FAC) against defendants USA Real Estate Investment Services, Inc., et al. alleging that defendant Marc Mendez aka Marcus Mendez (Mendez) defrauded Plaintiff of its property by forging its presidents signature on a promissory note and fraudulently foreclosing on the subject property. The complaint sets forth eleven causes of action for (1) Malicious Prosecution, (2) Quiet Title, (3) Fraud, (4) Civil Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, (5) Aiding and Abetting Fraud, (6) Rescission (7) Equitable Set Aside of Foreclosure, (8) Wrongful Foreclosure, (9) Abuse of Process, (10) Violation of Civil Code § 2943, (11) Promissory Estoppel. Defendant Mendez moves to quash service of summons and FAC. Any opposition was due on or before August 2, 2024; none has been filed to date. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. On August 31, 2022, the Court consolidated this case with cases 22STUD00257 and 22STUD00250. On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed its proof of service as to Defendant Mendez. On July 20, 2023, Mendez filed his first motion to quash service of summons. On August 16, 2023, Mendezs motion to quash service of summons was granted. On March 31, 2024, Plaintiffs application for an order for publication was granted to serve Mendez via Plano Star Courier, a newspaper published in Plano, Texas. On April 2, 2024, Plaintiffs application for an order for publication was granted to serve Mendez via the Metropolitan News-Enterprise, a newspaper published in Los Angeles, California. On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed proof of publication of service via the Metropolitan News-Enterprise in Los Angeles, California. On June 3, 2024, Mendez filed his second motion to quash service of summons. III. LEGAL STANDARD [C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)¿¿ When a defendant challenges the courts personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving the facts requisite to an effective service. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper. However, the presumption arises only if the proof of service complies with the applicable statutory requirements. (Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 790.)¿ On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citations.] The burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified complaint may not be considered as supplying the necessary facts. [Citation.] (Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1203.) IV. DISCUSSION Mendez argues Plaintiff failed to effectuate valid service of process by publication, because the proof of publication provides he was served in California when Plaintiff is not a resident of California. Mendez declares that he is a resident of the State of Texas. (Decl. Mendez ¶ 2.) Mendez further argues that despite the Hon. Juge Mark E. Windham signing an Order for Publication for Plaintiff on March 31, 2024 to serve Mendez by publication in Plano, Texas, Plaintiff has still failed to effectuate valid service on Mendez. There is no proof of service by publication in Texas to date. Here, Mendez has rebutted the presumption that service was proper. (Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.].)¿Because Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, Plaintiff necessarily fails to prove that proper service had been effectuated. V. CONCLUSION Mendezs motion to quash service of summons is GRANTED Moving Party is ordered to give notice. DATED: August 14, 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

Document

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