Notice OF FILING OF PETITION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE AND OF AUTOMATIC - Notice July 10, 2018 (2024)

Case

24-CIV-03431

Jul 29, 2024 |24-CIV-03431

Case

BARBARA NGUYEN, et al vs. YISROEL HERZKA, et al

Jul 31, 2024 |Swope, V. Raymond |(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD |24-CIV-04750

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24-CIV-04751

Jul 31, 2024 |24-CIV-04751

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24-CIV-04671

Jul 29, 2024 |24-CIV-04671

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24-CIV-04674

Jul 29, 2024 |24-CIV-04674

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24-CIV-04680

Jul 29, 2024 |24-CIV-04680

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24-CIV-04805

Aug 01, 2024 |24-CIV-04805

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24-CIV-04706

Jul 30, 2024 |24-CIV-04706

Ruling

GOVIND VAGHASHIA VS PRASHANT VAGHASHIA ET AL

Aug 01, 2024 |BC696133

Case Number: BC696133 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING GOVIND VAGHASHIA vs. PRASHANT VAGHASHIA, et al. Case No.: BC696133 Related Case Nos.: BC696798 and BS172969 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 The Govind Parties motion to quash is CONTINUED. On 7/3/2018, Plaintiffs Govind Vaghashia (Govind) as an individual and on behalf of Graphic Research, Inc. dba Gtek/Bycan Systems filed a second amended complaint (SAC) against Prashant Vaghashia (Prashant), Graphic Research, Inc. dba Gtek/Bycan Systems (GRI), alleging: (1) involuntary dissolution; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) accounting; and (4) violation of Corporations Code sections 1601 and 1602. On 5/28/2024, the Govind Parties filed a motion to quash deposition subpoena on non-party Wells Fargo Bank for production of business records. On 7/19/2024, the Los Angeles Court Systems network was the victim of a cyberattack which disrupted eCourts filing and document system. At this time, eCourt is unable to retrieve the motion filed by the Govind Parties, and a hardcopy courtesy copy was not filed with the Court. Moreover, given the disruption to the filing system, it is unclear whether an opposition or reply were ever filed. The motion is continued to allow the motion to be refiled. Opposition and reply due according to Code. Based on the foregoing, the Govind Parties motion to quash is continued. It is so ordered. Dated: August , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Ruling

JIMMI LEWIS VS VOI INSURANCE SOLUTIONS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |22STCP04241

Case Number: 22STCP04241 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 86 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Date: 7/16/24 (1:30 PM) Case: Jimmi Lewis v. VOI Insurance Solutions, LLC et al. (22STCP04241) TENTATIVE RULING: Respondent R&T Management, Inc.s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED. Pursuant to Civil Code § 1717, Respondent R&T Management, Inc. (R&T) moves for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $97,963.20. Petitioner Jimmi Lewis contended in his Petition for Writ of Mandate that he was entitled to inspect the records of VOI Insurance Solutions, LLC (VOI) as a member of VOI under the Operating Agreement. (Pet. ¶ 8, citing Ex. 1 to Pet. [Operating Agreement], § 5.3; Pet. ¶ 14.) Petitioner sued R&T as the purported current manager and member of VOI. (Pet. ¶ 3.) Petitioner sought attorney fees that he incurred in enforcing his purported inspection rights under the Operating Agreement. (Pet. ¶ 17, citing Operating Agreement § 18.21.) On March 19, 2024, the Court denied the Petition for Writ of Mandate. (Mircheff Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. E.) Civil Code § 1717(a) states: In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorneys fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).) The statute allows for mutuality of remedy when a person sued on a contract containing a provision for attorney fees to the prevailing party defends the litigation by successfully arguing the inapplicability, invalidity, unenforceability, or nonexistence of the same contract. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 611.) Petitioner alleged that R&T, as manager of VOI, was obligated under the Operating Agreement to allow inspection of VOIs records. (Pet. ¶¶ 8, 12.) The Operating Agreement contains an attorney fee provision. (Pet. ¶ 17, citing Operating Agreement § 18.21.) R&T prevailed in arguing that it was no longer a manager or member of VOI and that, accordingly, the Operating Agreement was unenforceable as to R&T. (Mircheff Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. E at 32.) As a result, R&T is entitled to recover attorney fees from petitioner under Civil Code § 1717(a). Indeed, the Court notes that petitioner did not challenge the applicability of Civil Code § 1717(a) in the opposition or the contention that R&T is a prevailing party. Instead, petitioner contends that the motion for fees is premature because the merits of VOIs Cross Petition and petitioners Cross-Cross Petition remain to be resolved in Department 24. (See 6/6/24 Minute Order [independent calendar court issued Order to Show Cause why cross-petitions should not be dismissed].) [C]ourts have awarded attorney fees to a party obtaining an appealable order or judgment in a discrete legal proceeding even though the underlying litigation on the merits was not final. (Otay River Constructors v. San Diego Expressway (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 796, 807; see also Turner v. Schultz (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 974, 983-84 [finding that party could recover fees under Civil Code § 1717 in discrete legal proceeding concerning whether arbitration should be allowed to proceed, even though arbitration of merits had not yet occurred].) A judgment in a special proceeding is the final determination of the rights of the parties therein. (CCP § 1064.) Writs of mandate are part of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing special proceedings of a civil nature. (CCP § 1085.) Judgment has been entered with respect to the Petition for Writ of Mandate. (Mircheff Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. F.) Judgment having been entered in a discrete legal proceeding, R&T may move for attorney fees, even though the cross petitions remain to be resolved. Petitioners citations to Moore v. Liu (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, Urbaniak v. Newton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1837, and Presley of Southern California v. Whelan (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 959 are unavailing because these cases involved reversals of summary judgment on appeal where the merits of the underlying litigation had not been resolved. (Moore, 69 Cal.App.4th at 754-55; Urbaniak, 19 Cal.App.4th at 1844; Presley, at 146 Cal.App.3d 959 [196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 2].) Here, the merits of the writ petition, a discrete legal proceeding, have been reduced to judgment. With respect to the amount of fees sought, R&T seeks fees for 179 hours of work defending against the Petition for Writ of Mandate, corresponding to $89,427.60 in fees, plus 18.6 hours working on the instant motion for attorney fees, corresponding to $8,535.60 in fees. (Mircheff Decl. ¶¶ 17-19 & Ex. G.) Petitioner argues that his writ petition was straightforward and that the number of hours claimed by R&T is excessive on its face. (Opp. at 4:9-10.) Petitioner asserts that overstaffing is evidenced by three attorneys having worked on the case. (Opp. at 2:13-14.) In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Petitioner generally asserts that the number of hours claimed by R&T is excessive without pointing to billing specific billing entries. Petitioners opposition is insufficient to merit a reduction in fees. Furthermore, 179 hours to defend against the writ petition is not excessive on its face. Petitioner contends that R&Ts opposition was based on conclusory arguments, including that R&T was not the managing member of VOI, the petition was overbroad, and petitioner did not make a pre-litigation demand. (Opp. at 3:27-4:8.) The Court disagrees with petitioners simplistic characterization of what was required of R&T to successfully address and defend against petitioners claims. R&T seeksand is entitledto recover for more than just drafting an opposition brief. Petitioner asserted that he had inspection rights under California and Delaware law, which required R&T to conduct research into petitioners contention. (Pet. ¶¶ 8, 9; Mircheff Decl. ¶ 20.) Petitioner also filed a cross-cross petition, forcing R&T to analyze petitioners claims and determine how to respond to the petition in the context of the instant writ proceeding. Counsel also developed R&Ts defense by regularly communicating with R&T. (Mircheff Decl. ¶ 20.) Notably, R&T does not seek fees for its motion to strike the writ petition, which was denied on May 18, 2023, or the motions to compel discovery responses, which were largely granted on September 14, 2023. (Mircheff Decl. ¶ 17.) Further, R&T applied a 10% discount to its fee request. (Mircheff Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19.) Based on the foregoing, combined with the Courts review of R&Ts billing records and petitioners failure to address any specific billing entries, the Court finds that R&Ts fee request, including counsels hourly rates, is reasonable. The motion is GRANTED. Using the appropriate lodestar approach, and based on the foregoing findings and in view of the totality of the circ*mstances, the total and reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred is $97,963.20. Such fees are awarded to respondent R&T Management, Inc. and against petitioner Jimmi Lewis.

Ruling

Schwartz Foundation, a California corporation, et al vs Donald Schwartz, et al

Jul 14, 2024 |21CV00416

21CV00416SCHWARTZ FOUNDATION v. SCHWARTZ PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND/OR ISSUE AND EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS These motions are continued due to defendants’ removal of this matter to federal court.All parties are directed to appear to discuss future scheduling. Page 1 of 4 LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 15, 2024 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Ruling

Schwartz Foundation, a California corporation, et al vs Donald Schwartz, et al

Aug 03, 2024 |21CV00416

21CV00416SCHWARTZ FOUNDATION v. SCHWARTZ PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND/OR ISSUE AND EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS These unopposed motions are granted. This discovery dispute concerns written discovery propounded on defendants in 2021 and2022. Page 3 of 6 I. DISCOVERY BACKGROUND Plaintiffs served a first set of written discovery on April 6, 2021, which consisted of formand special interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions,on defendants. Due to inadequate responses, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel furtherresponses, which this court granted on January 10, 2022, and ordered the payment of sanctions.(Ex. 1 to Dec. of Schum.) Defendants did not comply with the January 10, 2022 order to servefurther, verified responses and never paid the sanctions ordered. (Dec. of Schum at ¶ 6.) On December 22, 2022, defendant Donald Schwartz served supplemental responses tosome of the discovery at issue, to which plaintiffs followed up with continued meet and conferefforts as they found the responses to lack compliance with the court’s prior order. (Dec. ofSchum at ¶¶ 12-13.) The other defendants, Charles P. Schwartz, III, David R. Schwartz, MichaelOsterberg, Paul D. Schwartz, and Stevon Schwartz failed to serve any supplemental responses asrequired by the January 10, 2022 court order. (Dec. of Schum at ¶ 12.) On March 21, 2023, plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel and requested sanctions.After the February 27, 2024, hearing on this motion, the court ordered defendants to serve code-compliant responses by March 29, 2024. The order stated, in part, that should defendants fail tocomply with the court’s order “the court may issue evidentiary sanctions in the form ofprohibiting the introduction of evidence not earlier produced in discovery, deeming mattersadmitted, and/or other appropriate terminating sanction(s).” (See Order dated March 11, 2024.)Plaintiffs assert they have not received the required discovery responses, documents production,or sanctions, as per the court’s March 11, 2024 order. (Dec. of Schum at ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs propounded a second set of written discovery on defendants Donald Schwartzand Michael Osterberg on January 4, 2022, which consisted of special interrogatories andrequests for production of documents. (Dec of Schum, Exs. 13-18.) Defendants Schwartz andOsterberg have never responded to these requests. (Dec. of Schum at ¶ 23.) After meet andconfer efforts, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel on March 22, 2023. The court granted thismotion to compel and ordered sanctions to be paid. (See Order dated March 11, 2024.) Plaintiffsassert defendants have ignored this order, have not served responses as required, and have notpaid the ordered sanctions. II. MOTIONS There are two motions before the court. Requests for admission deemed admitted Page 4 of 6 Plaintiffs request the truth of all matters specified in plaintiffs’ request for admissions, setone be deemed admitted, a confirmation that objections have been waived, and award sanctions.Plaintiffs contend as to Donald Schwartz, the January 10, 2022 and March 11, 2024 ordersrequired him to provide code-compliant responses to requests for admissions Nos. 25, 26, 27, 42,49, and 50 and as to the other defendants, the January 10 and March 11 orders required them toprovide verified responses to all requests. As noted above, plaintiffs served written discovery, including the requests for admissionsat issue in this motion on all defendants, on April 6, 2021. (Dec. of Takano at ¶ 3.) DonaldSchwartz served responses on May 17, 2021. (Dec. of Takano at ¶ 4.) On May 17, 2021 the otherdefendants served unverified responses. (Dec. of Takano at ¶ 5.) A motion to compel followedand the court granted plaintiffs’ motion and request for sanctions on January 10, 2022. (Dec. ofTakano, Ex. A.) Defendants did not comply with this order and plaintiffs filed a second motionto compel on March 21, 2023 which was not heard until February 27, 2024. (Dec. of Takano at¶¶ 11-12.) The court granted this second motion to compel and gave defendants until March 29,2024 to comply. Defendants have not complied with either order. (Dec. of Takano at ¶¶ 14-16.)Plaintiffs assert the March 11, 2024 order specifically warned defendants that their failure tocomply may result in the court deeming the matters admitted. Defendants did not oppose this motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (e) states that “[i]f a party thenfails to obey an order compelling further response to requests for admission, the court may orderthat the matters involved in the requests be deemed admitted. In lieu of, or in addition to, thisorder, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section2023.010).” Plaintiffs demonstrated they served requests for admissions on defendants. Only DonaldSchwartz responded but certain of his responses were found to be deficient by the court and hewas ordered to serve compliant responses, which he failed to do on two separate occasions. Theother defendants failed to respond to the requests, even after court order, requiring verification. (1) As to the requests for admissions, set one, directed to Donald Schwartz, the truth of the matters specified in plaintiffs’ request for admissions, set one, nos. 25, 26, 27, 42, 49 and 50 are deemed admitted and objections waived. (2) As to the request for admissions, set one propounded to Paul D. Schwartz, Charles P Schwartz, David R. Schwartz, Stevon S. Schwartz, and Michael Osterberg, all are deemed admitted and objections are waived. Motion for issue and/or terminating sanctions Page 5 of 6 Plaintiffs also seek and order: (1) striking defendants’ answers to the complaint and firstamended complaint and (2) striking Donald Schwartz’s and Micheal Osterberg’s cross-complaintfiled September 23, 2021. In the alternative, plaintiffs request issue or evidentiary sanctions. Themotion to strike is granted. Plaintiffs assert terminating sanctions are warranted pursuant to Code of Civil Proceduresection 2023.010 which outlines the misuse of the discovery process and section 2023.030,subdivision (d) which allows for terminating sanctions. Plaintiffs contend that the incrementalapproach to discovery sanctions has been followed, as defendants failed to comply with twoprior court orders. Defendants have not opposed this motion. The court has the discretion to grant, or not grant, the requested sanctions. (Sauer v. Sup.Ct. (Oak Indus. Inc.(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d, 213, 228.) The court may strike a party’s pleading,stay proceedings, dismiss a party’s action, or enter default against that party pursuant to Code ofCivil Procedure section 2023.202, subdivision (d). (Weil & Brown Civil Procedure Before Trial(TRG 2023) § 8:2185.) Reviewing the voluminous pleadings relating to this discovery dispute, the court’s priororders, and the history of defendants failing to comply with these orders over a lengthy period oftime, the court finds terminating sanctions as requested by plaintiffs are appropriate. Onlyissuing monetary sanctions has not compelled defendants to comply with the court’s orders andthe Discovery Act. Defendants’ answers to the complaint and first amended complaint are stricken. Thecross-complaint filed by Donald Schwartz and Michael Osterberg is stricken. In addition, thecourt awards monetary sanctions in the amount of $4,000.00, jointly and severally againstdefendants and their counsel, payable within 20 days from the date the court’s order on thesemotions are entered.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 6 of 6

Ruling

NICOLE RIO VS MYTH DIVISION LLC, ET AL.

Jul 11, 2024 |23STCP02715

Case Number: 23STCP02715 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING NICOLE RIO vs. MYTH DIVISION, LLC, et al. Case No.: 23STCP02715 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED IN PART, SUSTAINED IN PART: - Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first, second, and third causes of action. - Defendants demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. Defendants motion to strike is DENIED. On 7/28/2024, Plaintiff Nicole Rio (Plaintiff) filed suit against Myth Division, LLC and Ramon Govea (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) demand for accounting; (3) unfair business practices; (4) declaratory relief; (5) money had and received; (6) fraud; and (7) unjust enrichment. On 5/15/2024, Defendants demurred to Plaintiffs Complaint. Defendants also moved to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint. Discussion Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to each cause of action. As for breach of fiduciary duty, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allegations are uncertain as to whether Govea would owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges [w]hile acting in his capacity as an employee, business partner and company founder, Govea owed a fiduciary duty to each and every one of the company founders and members, including Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 25.) The Court accepts well-pled allegations as true at the pleading stage. Moreover, Defendants overstate the law with respect to fiduciary duties. In their motion, Defendants contend that in California, LLC members have a fiduciary duty to each other only if the LLC is member managed and not manager managed. (Corp. Code §17704.09(a), (f).) However, subdivision (f)(1) states that while subdivision (a) of the section does not apply to members of a manager-managed LLC (i.e., no fiduciary duty is owed to member), it does apply to the manager or managers of a manager-managed LLC: (f) In a manager-managed limited liability company, all of the following rules apply: (1) Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (e) apply to the manager or managers and not the members. (2) Subdivision (d) applies to the members and managers. (3) Except as otherwise provided, a member does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited liability company or to any other member solely by reason of being a member. (Corp. Code §17704.09, subd. (f).) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Govea is a managing member of Myth Division LLC. Accordingly, whether the LLC is a member-managed LLC or the LLC is a manager-managed LLC, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts at the pleadings stage to show that Defendant owed a fiduciary duty. The Court also finds Plaintiffs facts to be sufficiently clear at the pleading stage. As for the second cause of action, Defendants argue that this claim fails given that it requires a fiduciary relationship to be alleged, and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show a fiduciary duty. As set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiffs allegations sufficient at the pleading stage to show a fiduciary relationship. As for the third cause of action, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not set forth any allegations of specific unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practices. However, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Govea improperly funneled money from their LLC into a company personally owed by Govea and his wife, and violated the terms of the LLC partnership by buying and selling property and entering into agreements without proper consultation with Plaintiff. (See e.g. Complaint ¶¶ 18, 19.) These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to show unlawful business practices. As for the fourth cause of action, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allegations for declaratory relief are uncertain. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs declaratory relief claim asserts [a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff on the one hand, and Defendants, on the other hand. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants have never been the author of her artistic works and therefore has never been the owner in and to any copyrights in the works, as they have never entered into any contract to complete the transfers of ownership and/or copyrights. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, Defendants contend there were and are the owner of all rights in and to all of their artistic work. (Complaint ¶ 43.) It is unclear what artistic works Plaintiff is referring to or what copyrights she refers to, as Plaintiff does not allege any artistic works as part of this claim. The Court will grant leave to amend to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to clarify. As for the fifth cause of action for money had and received, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged any certain sum that is owed. "A cause of action for money had and received is stated if it is alleged [that] the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff. The claim is viable wherever one person has received money which belongs to another, and which in equity and good conscience should be paid over to the latter." (Avidor v. Sutter's Place, Inc. (2013). 212 Cal. App. 4th 1439, 1454.) However, the reference to certain sum does not mean that the specific amount must be alleged, but rather that the specific amount is able to be ascertained. However, Plaintiffs allegations are uncertain. While Plaintiffs allegations could show that Defendants misused funds which were intended to benefit the LLC, Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could show that she gave money for her own personal benefit which was then not used for that benefit, and was not returned to Plaintiff. As for the sixth cause of action for fraud, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged fraud with the requisite specificity. The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges that Govea represented that he would account for and pay Plaintiff for her work, that Govea provided Plaintiffs content to companies Defendant had personal interest in and who had no right to receive Plaintiffs content, and then knowingly concealed this practice from Plaintiff to keep her from discovering it. (Complaint ¶¶ 48-51.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant misrepresented the contributions owed to her, and where her content was being given. (Id. at ¶52.) While these allegations are nearly sufficient, there are uncertainties as to what content Plaintiff is referring to. Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations are confusing as they refer to content and contributions making it unclear what exactly Plaintiff is referring to, or what exactly Plaintiff alleges was the fraudulent conduct. For example, Plaintiff alleges: The true facts are that Govea actually provided Plaintiffs content to companies defendant Govea had personal interests in and who did not have any right to receive Plaintiffs content, and that they had been keeping Plaintiffs accounting records hidden from her so that they would not be able to receive the money owing her. (Complaint ¶ 51.) Plaintiff must make clear the specifics of what she is alleging. Finally, as for the seventh cause of action, Defendant argues that there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. While unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, courts have stated that unjust enrichment is synonymous with restitution and allowed recovery where the plaintiff asserts a proper basis for recovering restitution. (See Durrell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370; McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387-88.) Such bases include quasi-contract, fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct. (See Durrell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 1370; McBride, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 387-88.) As such, Plaintiff is not precluded as a matter of law from asserting a claim for unjust enrichment. However, a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where the parties' rights are defined by an express agreement. (California Medical Assn., Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.) Here, Plaintiff expressly alleges the formation of a business agreement, and refers to herself as a founder of Myth Division LLC. (Complaint ¶¶ 6- 15.) As such, Plaintiff has alleged an express, contractual relationship between the parties. Thus, Plaintiff must address the uncertainty as to whether or not the parties rights are defined by an express agreement. If so, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for unjust enrichment, but must rather seek relief through contract-based claims. Based on the foregoing, Defendants demurrer is overruled in part, sustained in part. Defendants demurrer is overruled as to the first, second, and third causes of action. Defendants demurrer is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend, as to the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages. Given the conclusion set forth above that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff has alleged facts which could show conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)). Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion to strike is denied. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Ruling

MCCOY vs FLEETWOOD ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.

Jul 10, 2024 |CVRI2205224

Motion for Summary Judgment on 1stMCCOY vs FLEETWOODAmended Complaint for Partnership andCVRI2205224 ALUMINUM PRODUCTS,Corporate Governance (Over 25,000) ofINC.MARK MCCOYTentative Ruling:This action involves claims by Plaintiff, Mark McCoy (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant, FleetwoodAluminum Products, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Fleetwood”) for violation of Corp. Code §§ 1600,1601,and 1602. There is a separate employment action involving the same parties, entitled McCoy v.Fleetwood Aluminum Products, Inc., CVRI2300147, in which Plaintiff, individually and derivativelyon behalf of Fleetwood, asserts 9 causes of action against Fleetwood and Defendants, JaniceMcCoy, Mica Gumbleton, Mara McCoy Cartier, and Michele Davis (the “Employment Action”). OnJanuary 4, 2024, the Court in that action granted Fleetwood’s motion to compel arbitration as toPlaintiff’s individual claims only.On February 2, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. On February 28, 2024, theCourt denied the motion to compel the matter to arbitration, but granted, in part, Defendant’srequest to stay the matter pending the outcome of the arbitration in the Employment Action “as tothe issue of whether Plaintiff has a right to Fleetwood’s business records pursuant to Corp. Code§ 1602 because he was not properly removed from his position as a director of Fleetwood only.”(2/28/24 Minute Order.) In the 2/28/24 Minute Order, the court noted the two main issues in thiscase are separate from the issues in the employment case and should proceed. Those issuesare: (1) whether Plaintiff is entitled to business records pursuant to Corp. Code §1601, as ashareholder of Fleetwood; and (2) whether Plaintiff is entitled to business records pursuant toCorp. Code §1602, as a director of Fleetwood.On March 11, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal of the order denying its motion to compelarbitration. (Decl. of Kamran Khakbaz [“Khakbaz Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. 2.) The court denied a motionto stay the proceedings pending the appeal on May 2, 2024.Defendant brings the instant motion for summary judgment as to the following issues: (1) McCoylacks standing to bring his first cause of action under Corp. Code §1602 because he is not acurrent director of Fleetwood; (2) Fleetwood’s filing of a statement of information inadvertentlyidentifying McCoy as a director in June 2022, that was later corrected, does not grant McCoystanding to demand documents under Corp. Code §1602; (3) Even if Fleetwood’s filing of anincorrect statement of information in June 2022 identifying McCoy as a director granted himstanding to bring a claim under Corporations Code section 1602, those rights would have ceasedto exist when Fleetwood filed a corrected statement of information in October 2022 that did notidentify McCoy as a director of Fleetwood; (4) even if McCoy were a director of Fleetwood, Corp.Code §1602 does not entitle him to access privileged communications generated in anticipationor defense of lawsuits he filed against Fleetwood; (5) Corp. Code §1604 does not authorizeMcCoy to recover attorney’s fees and costs for his first cause of action under Corp. Code §1602;(6) McCoy’s second cause of action under Corp. Code §1602 fails as a matter of law becauseFleetwood has complied with its obligations as a matter of law so the claim is moot; and (7)McCoy’s prayer for relief seeking attorney’s fees and costs under Corp. Code §1604 fails becauseMcCoy did not make a proper demand under Corp. Code §1601 prior to filing this lawsuit.In Opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues there is a triable issue of material fact as to his statusas a director. Plaintiff argues that the fact Fleetwood represented to the State of California thatMcCoy was still a director on its June 7, 2022 Statement of Information creates a triable issue ofmaterial fact as to whether he was a director on that date. Plaintiff argues there are triable issuesof material fact as to whether Fleetwood refused a lawful demand under section 1601, both inOctober 2022 and again in January 2023, and as to whether Fleetwood’s actions entitled McCoyto attorneys’ fees. McCoy further argues that Fleetwood’s May and June 2023 documentproductions were incomplete for various reasons (no privilege log, documents refer to otherresponsive documents that were not produce and fails to include any documents related to thethen-impending sale to Masonite). McCoy also contends the Separate Statement is procedurallydefective.AnalysisI. Standard on Motion for Summary JudgmentSummary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to entry of judgment asa matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to makea prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Aguilarv. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Defendant, as the moving party, has theburden to show either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established orthat there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (CCP §437c(p)(2).) Defendant can meettheir burden by showing either: (1) affirmative evidence that shows an element of the claim cannotbe established; or (2) showing an absence of evidence on a critical element of Plaintiff’s claim.Once the moving party has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the responding party toshow that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to adefense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Ifthe responding party does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the movingparty is appropriate.“The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues but merely to discover… whether the parties possess evidence which demands the analysis of trial.” (Colvin v. City ofGardena (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1275 (italics added).) Summary judgment can be grantedonly where the essential facts are either conceded or beyond dispute. If there is one, singlematerial fact in dispute, the motion must be denied.The court also has the power to summarily adjudicate that one or more causes of action have nomerit, that there is no merit to one or more affirmative defenses, or that a defendant owed or didnot owe a duty to plaintiff. A motion for summary adjudication shall only be granted if it completelydisposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.(CCP §437c(f)(1).)II. Requests for Judicial NoticePlaintiff asks the court to take judicial notice of thirty-one court records. The court can do so underEvidence Code §452(d).III. Separate StatementThe Statement of Undisputed Material Facts must separately identify each cause of action, claim,issue of duty or affirmative defense and each supporting material fact claimed to be withoutdispute with respect to that cause of action, claim, issue of duty or affirmative defense. (Cal. Rulesof Court, Rule 3.1350(d).)The Separate Statement first lists facts in support of the motion generally. Then, each issue islisted individually, and facts are listed to support each issue. The Separate Statement isprocedurally proper.IV. ObjectionsIn granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court needrule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved forappellate review. (CCP §437c(q).)Plaintiff objects to the declarations of Gregory A. Nylen, Michele Davis, and Michael Davis.Plaintiff objects to statements in these declarations that McCoy was removed as a director andexplanations of the method by which he was removed (Board vote and approval). To the extentthese statements indicate that McCoy was properly removed as a director, the objections aresustained as that issue has been stayed. Otherwise, the objections are overruled. (Obj. to NylenDecl; Michele Davis Decl. ¶4; ¶7; ¶10; ¶12; Michael Davis Decl. ¶¶4-6.)V. First Cause of Action – Corp. Code §1602Corporations Code § 1602 provides that “[e]very director shall have the absolute right at anyreasonable time to inspect and copy all books, records and documents of every kind and toinspect the physical properties of the corporation of which such person is a director and also ofits subsidiary corporations, domestic or foreign. Such inspection by a director may be made inperson or by agent or attorney and the right to inspection includes the right to copy and makeextracts.”Defendant argues this claim fails as a matter of law. Defendant argues that McCoy was notentitled to documents when he requested them because he was not a director at the time herequested the documents in October 2022. Furthermore, Defendant argues McCoy is notcurrently entitled to documents under this section because he is not currently a director ofFleetwood.On February 28, 2024, the court noted the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to business recordspursuant to Corp. Code §1602, as a director of Fleetwood is not stayed. (2/28/24 Minute Order.)This is the issue before the court now.Defendant argues that McCoy lacks standing to bring this claim because he is not a currentdirector of Fleetwood. “It is well established that a director’s right to inspect corporate books andrecords ends upon his or her removal from office.” (Chantiles v. Lake Forest II MasterHomeowners Assn. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 914, 920.) “A former director has no right to an ongoingand enforceable right to inspect corporate records.” (Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th903, 919.) Defendant argues that since McCoy is not currently a director of Fleetwood, even if hewas entitled to records at the time he requested them, he is not currently entitled to records sothis claim fails.Defendant argues that McCoy was not entitled to records at the time he made his demandbecause he was properly removed as a director. But the issue of whether he was properlyremoved as a director is not before the court now as this issue was stayed on 2/28/24. Theseissues are closely related – whether McCoy is/was entitled to documents as a director is directlyrelated to whether he was properly removed as a director. If he was properly removed as adirector, he would not be entitled to records under §1602. If he was not properly removed as adirector, he would still be a director and be entitled to the records. Thus, it seems to the Court thatone cannot discuss one issue without the other. Regardless, there are triable issues of materialfact as to whether McCoy is a director.Defendant provides evidence that McCoy was removed as director and, as a result, is notcurrently a director. (Michael Davis Decl. ¶6; Michele Davis Decl. ¶9.) This is enough evidence tomeet Defendant’s initial burden.In Opposition, Plaintiff contends there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendantwas a director when he requested the documents and whether he is a director now. Defendantacknowledges that the June 7, 2022 Statement of Information filed with the State of Californialisted McCoy as a director of Fleetwood. (SUMF No. 12.) This presents a triable issue of materialfact as to whether McCoy was a director when he requested the documents on October 5, 2022.(SUMF 13 & McCoy Decl. ¶8.) McCoy also presents evidence that no vote took place betweenJune 7, 2022 and October 5, 2022 to remove him as director. (McCoy ¶¶5, 6.) Whether the June7, 2022 Statement of Information inadvertently listed McCoy as a director is a triable issue ofmaterial fact. It is undisputed that McCoy was listed as a director at that time, but whether thiswas inadvertent and the result of a valid vote to remove him as director is a triable issue of materialfact. Then, if no additional vote occurred to remove McCoy as a director, the updated Statementof Information filed on October 24, 2022 would be incorrect and not constitute evidence thatMcCoy was not a director at that time. There are triable issues of material fact as to whetherMcCoy is still a director, given the June 7, 2022 Statement of Information that listed him as adirector. The motion is denied as to this cause of action.Defendant also argues that if the court finds McCoy does have inspection rights under section1602, those rights must be limited in scope to materials that are not privileged. This is not a properissue for determination at this time. As discussed, there are triable issues of material fact as towhether McCoy was a director when he requested the documents and whether he is a directornow. The specifics of which documents he is entitled to receive only become relevant if he isfound to be entitled to the documents at all because he is/was a director.Defendant also argues that McCoy is not entitled to attorney fees under section 1602 becausesection 1604 only provides for attorney fees for actions under section 1600 or section 1601. InOpposition, Plaintiff does not dispute this and focuses his argument solely on his right to attorneyfees for his section 1601 claim. Accordingly, the motion with respect to issue 5 is granted.VI. Second Cause of ActionDefendants argue that: McCoy’s second cause of action under Corp. Code §1602 fails as a matterof law because Fleetwood has complied with its obligations as a matter of law so the claim ismoot; and McCoy’s prayer for relief seeking attorney’s fees and costs under Corp. Code §1604fails because McCoy did not make a proper demand under Corp. Code §1601 prior to filing thislawsuit.Corporations Code §1601(a) permits a shareholder a limited right to inspect and copy “[t]heaccounting books, records, and minutes of proceedings of the shareholders and the board andcommittees of the board…for a purpose reasonably related to the holder’s interests as ashareholder.” Although shareholders have some rights to corporate information which are notenjoyed by general public, shareholder status does not in and of itself entitle individualshareholder to unfettered access to corporate confidences and secrets. (National Football LeagueProperties, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 100.) “Upon refusal of a lawful demandfor inspection, the [court]…may enforce the right of inspection with just and proper conditions…”(Corp. Code §1603.)Defendant argues that this cause of action fails because McCoy did not demand any documentsunder section 1601 prior to filing the instant lawsuit. Defendant argues that section 1603 meansthere can be no “refusal” of a “lawful demand” unless a demand was made prior to filing suit.Here, the instant action was filed on November 29, 2022. Defendant provides evidence thatMcCoy served Fleetwood with a written demand for Fleetwood’s books and records under Cpro.Code §§ 1501, 1600 and 1602 on October 5, 2022. (SUMF No. 13.) Plaintiff does not dispute thisfact. Defendant presents evidence that it was not until January 19, 2023 that Plaintiff requesteddocuments under Corp. Code §1601. (SUMF No. 20.) Plaintiff also does not dispute this fact. Thisis sufficient to meet Defendant’s initial burden.Plaintiff contends that he served a “written demand to inspect documents pursuant to [his] rightsas a director and shareholder of Fleetwood, pursuant to the California Corporations Code” onFleetwood on October 5, 2022 – before he filed the instant suit. (McCoy Decl. ¶8.) McCoy assertsthat Fleetwood did not produce its accounting books, records, minutes of proceedings of itsshareholders or its Board or its committees of the Board pursuant to his demand as a shareholderbetween October 5, 2022 and November 29, 2022. (Ibid.) From the evidence before the court, itappears that the parties agree McCoy made a demand for documents on October 5, 2022, butdisagree as to what exactly the demand requested. McCoy believes he properly requesteddocuments under section 1601 as a shareholder. Defendant, on the other hand, notes McCoy didnot identify section 1601 in the demand and did not identify the purpose for which he sought therecords, which is a requirement under section 1601 (shareholders have the right to inspect certaindocuments relating to the business of a corporation “for a purpose reasonably related to suchholder’s interest as a shareholder…”). Given McCoy’s declaration and the conflicting evidencebefore the court, there is a triable issue of material fact as to this claim. The motion is denied.Defendant next argues that this claim fails because it has produced all of the requesteddocuments. Defendant meets its initial burden to show that it produced documents to Plaintiff.However, Plaintiff has provided evidence of triable issues of material fact as to whether all of therequested and responsive documents were, in fact, produced. (See Response to SUMF No. 29;see also AUMF No. 18.) At the very least, there appear to be “gaps” in Defendant’s productionwhich gives rise to a triable issue of material fact.The issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees is also denied at this time because thereis a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff properly made a demand under section1601 prior to filing this lawsuit.VII. SummaryRequest for Judicial Notice: Grant.Objections: To the extent these statements indicate that McCoy was properly removed as adirector, the objections are sustained as that issue has been stayed. Otherwise, the objectionsare overruled. (Obj. to Nylen Decl; Michele Davis Decl. ¶4; ¶7; ¶10; ¶12; Michael Davis Decl. ¶¶4-6.)Merits: Grant the motion with respect to issue 5. Deny the motion as to all other issues.

Ruling

Schwartz Foundation, a California corporation, et al vs Donald Schwartz, et al

Jul 18, 2024 |21CV00416

21CV00416SCHWARTZ FOUNDATION v. SCHWARTZ PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND/OR ISSUE AND EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS These motions are continued due to defendants’ removal of this matter to federal court.All parties are directed to appear to discuss future scheduling. Page 1 of 4 LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 15, 2024 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Ruling

RG19033172

Aug 01, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Securities Litigation Case) |RG19033172

RG19033172: Banks VS JPM Chase Bank 08/01/2024 Hearing on Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens filed by DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-4 (Non-Party) in Department 24Tentative Ruling - 07/29/2024 Rebekah EvensonThe Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens filed by DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUSTCOMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-4 on 06/14/2024is Granted.The unopposed Motion by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company to Expunge Notice ofPendency of Action is GRANTED.Plaintiff did not oppose this motion, and therefore she fails to establish the probable validity ofany real property claim that may be asserted in this case. (See Code of Civil Procedure section405.32.) The Court observes that this case was dismissed nearly five years ago based onPlaintiff’s failure to pay the required initial filing fee.Deutsche Bank’s request for sanctions against Plaintiff is DENIED. Deutsche Bank’s openingbrief did not discuss or provide any legal basis for an award of sanctions, and Deutsche Bank didnot file any evidence indicating the amount of fees and costs, if any, it has incurred in preparingand filing this motion.The Court will sign the (proposed) Order Expunging Notice of Pendency of Action submittedwith Deutsche Bank’s moving papers.

Ruling

Schwartz Foundation, a California corporation, et al vs Donald Schwartz, et al

Jul 19, 2024 |21CV00416

21CV00416SCHWARTZ FOUNDATION v. SCHWARTZ PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND/OR ISSUE AND EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS These motions are continued due to defendants’ removal of this matter to federal court.All parties are directed to appear to discuss future scheduling. Page 1 of 4 LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 15, 2024 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

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